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1. Introduction 
On May 14, 2010 the first high-profile removal of the head of a GLC was reported in all Malaysian press. The 
Sime Darby Bhd’s group chief executive officer (CEO), Dato’ Ahmad Zubir Murshid was asked to take a leave of 
absence before the expiry of his contract on Nov 26, 2010. The Sime Darby chairman, Tun Musa Hitam comments 
that Zubir’s leaving was in connection with the cost overruns amounting of RM964 million that the group’s energy 
and utilities division had suffered in carrying out projects in Qatar and the Bakun hydro-electric dam (The Star, May 
14).  As in Sime Darby case, it seems that top management (both the CEO and supposedly the Chairman) has a 
significant influence on firm performance. Thus, it is interesting to study whether CEO/Chairman characteristics 
have some impacts on firm performance on a wider perspective. This is in line with views from the resource 
dependency theory (RDT) that proposes directors are appointed based on specific skills and experience (see 
empirical works on RDT in Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009 on women on boards; Jackling & Johl, 2009 on board 
meeting; Singh, 2007 on ethnicity on board and Chen, Dyball & Wright, 2009 on diversifications). In terms of 
contribution of the study, this study provides avenues on the current CEO/Chairman characteristics’ selection in 
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Malaysian market. This work also provides evidence on the importance of CEO/Chairman characteristics’ in 
enhancing the firm performance. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Given the high responsibility and commitment by the stakeholders, Chairman and CEO need to ensure firm 
performance is leading towards the company objectives. Thus, to be a Chairman or CEO for company, an individual 
needs to possess certain criteria and qualities and these fit with the resource dependency theory. The attributes 
considered in this study are education level, professional qualification, age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 
2.1  Education level 
A professional CEO with a higher educational background provide a valuable human capital to the company. A 
higher educational background such as the post-graduate level will increase the value of individual’s human capital 
(Phan & Hoon, 1995) or as having a higher cognitive ability, higher capacity for decision processing, higher 
tolerance for ambiguity and propensity or receptivity to innovation which equip them with an effective solution for a 
complex decision making task (Bantel & Jackson 1989). As a result, CEOs with high education qualification are less 
likely to experience turnover as their turnover portray a loss to a company (Thomas et al., 1991; Ou-Yan & Shuang-
Shii, 2007) as the CEO serves some functional backgrounds (as argued in Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) which include 
problem definition, information procession and strategic choices (Rajagopalan & Dafta, 1996).Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1: CEO/Chairman of GLCs with higher educational level has better performance than CEO/Chairman with 
lower educational level. 
 
2.2 Professional qualification 
The revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012) stresses that nominating commitees should 
consider recruiting directors that have skills, experience and qualifications. Directors’ expertise such as in 
accounting, financing, consulting and law supports managers in making decisions especially in specific business 
settings (Brockbank, Ulrich & Beatty, 1999; Zajac & Stearns, 1997; Guner et al., 2007), and become more effective 
strategic business partners (Lawler & Mohrman, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Professional appointees received a 
stronger stock market reaction (Defond, Hann & Hu, 2005; Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000) and provide better 
monitoring (Erickson et al., 2005). Today’s professional managers are more likely to move between firms as and 
when their expertise is required by all firms (Hayes & Abernathy, 1980). Based on the above arguments, we 
hypothesize that: 
H2: CEO/Chairman of GLCs with professional qualification has better performance than CEO/Chairman with no 
professional qualification. 
 
2.3 CEO/Chairman age 
 Brockmann and Simmonds (1997) argues that managerial success is positively correlated with age as older 
executives also tend to be more risk averse than younger executives (Carlsson & Karlsson, 1970). However, the 
Companies Act 1965 in Malaysia prohibits the appointment of a person of or over the age of 70 years as a director 
of a public company or subsidiary of a public company. For listed companies, the CEOs need to retire at least once 
in every three years but they are eligible for re-election. Based on the arguments, it is hypothesized that: 
H3: GLCs with older CEO/Chairman has better performance than younger CEO/Chairman. 
 
2.4 Gender 
Women lack industry experience and they concentrate on less profitable sectors (Loscocco et al., 1991; 
Alowaihan, 2004) and as such creates a barrier to business (Fischer et al., (1993). Women also employ fewer 
employees, and have smaller annual sales than their male counterparts (Shim & Eestlick, 1998). Women business 
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owners are found to undercapitalise their firms, typically investing approximately only one third of the capital used 
by men (Shaw et al., 2009).  Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4: GLCs with male CEO/Chairman has better performance than female CEO/Chairman. 
 
2.5 Ethnicity 
Hofstede (1991) suggests that the two main ethnic groups (Malay and Chinese) are both low on masculinity but 
high on power distance. The Malays have high uncertainty avoidance which is reflected their uneasiness in dealing 
with ambiguities and uncertainty. They encourage collectivism, but at the same time they are more secretive which 
implies low disclosure. In contrast, the Chinese are rated as low uncertainty avoidance, individualistic, willing to 
accept new challenges and willing to take a greater risk (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). However, majority of GLCs are 
headed by Malay leaders, thus we hypothesize that: 
H5: Malay CEO/Chairman of GLCs has better performance than Chinese CEO/Chairman. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
3.1 Sample size 
This study utilised using the secondary data over the period of 2005 to 2009 (5 years). A list of GLCs was 
obtained from the website http://www.pcg.gov.my. Data on  CEO/Chairman  profile such as professional 
qualification, education level, age, gender and ethnicity were hand-collected using the annual reports. ROA data was 
gathered from Thomson Financial Datastream Advance.  
 
3.3 Research model and measurement  
 
PERFit = b0 + b1EDUCit + b2PROFit + b3AGEit + b4GENDERit + b5ETHNICit + b6DEBTit + b7FAGEit + b8FSIZEit+ 
eit  
 
3.4 Model specification  
The dependent variable ROA is the ratio of accounting earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of 
assets. The use of ROA as a performance measure is more preferable than other accounting measures (ROE, EPS) 
because the operating income used to calculate ROA is not influenced by special charges and also less susceptible to 
manipulation by managers (Bushman & Smith, 2001). For CEO/Chairman attributes such as education level, 
professional qualification, age, gender and ethnicity were measured using dummy (0,1). The control variables were 
debt, firm age and firm size. Debt is the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. Firm age is the number 
of years since incorporation. Firm size is the natural log of book value over total assets.  
3. Findings and discussions  
Based on Table 1, results reveal that majority of Chairman (69.4%) and CEO (66%) do possess a degree 
qualification. 21.4% of the Chairman are professionally qualified, and 22.1% CEOs are professionally qualified. 
Even though the number is still low but the professional qualification adds credibility to a person and he is referred 
to as ‘expert’ in his area. Chairman of 51-70 years amounted to 66.4%, with the youngest at the aged of 31 and the 
eldest at 61 years. For the CEO, the percentage is 66.2% for CEO of 51-70 years with minimum age of 31 and eldest 
at 64 years. GLCs do have more male Chairman (77.6%) and CEO (85.5%) as compared to female Chairman 
(22.4%) and CEO (14.5%). Majority of Chairman for GLCs (74.1%) are Malays, followed by 19.7% Chinese and 
6.2% of foreign Chairman. For the CEO, GLCs comprise 73.3% Malays, 12.5% Chinese and 14.2% foreign CEO.  
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Table 1: Percentage for CEO and Chairman characteristics 
 
  % % 
  Chairman CEO 
EDUC With degree 69.4 66.0 
 Without degree 30.6 34.0 
PROF With professional qualification 21.4 22.1 
 Without professional qualification 78.6 77.9 
AGE 30-50 years old 33.6 8.2 
 51-70 years old 66.4 66.2 
 71 and above years old - 25.6 
GENDER Male 77.6 85.5 
 Female  22.4 14.5 
ETHNİC  Malay  74.1 73.3 
 Chinese  19.7 12.5 
 Indian  - - 
 Foreigner  6.2 14.2 
 
With reference to Table 2 (Panel A), there is a positive relationship between Chairman age and firm performance 
(ROA). Older chairman has higher level of experience (Carlsson & Karlsson, 1970) and maybe risk averse 
(Brockmann & Simmonds,1997). Arguably, such chairman of the board could provide a check and balance to the 
management team led by the CEO. Ethnicity also shows a positive relationship with the firm performance. The 
Malay Chairman was found to be associated higher firm performance. The Malays have high uncertainty avoidance 
which is reflected their uneasiness in dealing with ambiguities and uncertainty. They encourage collectivism, but at 
the same time they are more secretive which implies low disclosure. 
 
Table 2: Regression analysis for Chairman and CEO characterisctics and firm performance 
 
 Panel A: Chairman Panel B: CEO 
 Coef. Std. error t P> t Coef. Std. error t P> t 
Education -.0122486 .0230027 -0.53 0.595 .0163826 .0296835 0.55 0.582 
Professional .0379732 .020653 1.84 0.067 -.0977519 .0188359 -5.19 0.000 
Age .0050623 .001023 4.95 0.000 -.0046773 .0012834 -3.64 0.000 
Gender .0143014 .0635742 0.22 0.822 -.0565514 .0694529 -0.81 0.416 
Ethnic .0724295 .0161829 4.48 0.000 .0745046 .009686 7.69 0.000 
Debt 3.42e-10 5.40e-10 0.63 0.528 -3.98e-10 5.10e-10 -0.78 0.436 
Firm age .0010888 .0005576 1.95 0.052 .0007424 .0004816 1.54 0.125 
Firm size -7.66e-10 2.86e-10 -2.68 0.008 -4.85e-11 2.52e-10 -0.19 0.847 
Constants  -.3344344 .0827479 -4.04 0.000 .2590354 .0972686 2.66 0.008 
Prob > F 0.0000    0.0000    
R-squared 0.1569    0.3168    
Adj R2 0.1286    0.2904    
 
In contrast, the Chinese are rated as low uncertainty avoidance, individualistic, willing to accept new challenges 
and willing to take a greater risk (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). İn terms of firm age, matured companies that operate in 
the market do contribute to better firm value, and small size companies do perform better as compared to large 
companies. For Table 2 (Panel B), there is a significant negative relationship between professional qualification of 
the CEO and CEO age with firm performance which is quite baffling. Younger CEOs perform better perhaps due 
that younger CEO tend to be more energetic, aggresive in action taking and willing to take the risk. İn terms of 
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ethnicity, this factor do add up the firm performance. Whilst, education and gender (for both Chairman and CEO) do 
not have any effect on performance.  
4. Conclusion  
The study finds some evidence  the experience of the older chairman and the aggresiveness of the younger CEO 
work as a better combination to achieving higher firm performance rather than having both older chairman and CEO 
or younger chairman and CEO although this speculation needs more careful future studies. The result on ethnicity 
although seems preliminary, still is indicative enough to suggest that major ethnic would be appointed on successful 
GLCs as it also a part of the New Economic Policy (NEP) initiatives set up by the ruling party. Although the study 
is limited to GLCs and its matched pair, it could be argued that the government selects companies that could reach 
public at large to be under its stable as it would have more direct and indirect impacts on government policies and 
could be generalized to similar state-business  mechanism which is familiar in Asian region. 
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